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to adopting the rule, that the idea that one may acquire such a
servitude over another's land by mere length of enjoyment, does
not find favor with the American courts, and has been rejected as
law in several of the states.
In conclusion, if any one shall be inclined to believe that a
larger space has been occupied with this subject than its importance deserves, it is only necessary to remind him of the magnitude
of the interests which may be involved in the questions here
examined, and of the recency and limited number of cases in
which decisions have been had, together with the learning and
labored analysis, which some of the ablest judges in England and
in our own country have devoted to the investigation.
E.W.
CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

(New Yorc C-urt of Appeals. March Term, 1862.)
CHRISTINA WILDS, ADMINISTRATRIX, ETC., VS. THE HUDSON RIVER
RAILROAD COMPANY.
In an action claiming damages for the negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff
cannot recover unless he was free from any degree of negligence which contributed directly towards the production of the injury.
Negligence is a question for the jury in all cases where upon the evidence the fact
o-it having occurred is fairly doubtful. In all other cases it may be determined
by the court, as a question of law.
At a railroad crossing it is carelessnesE in any one approaching with a team, not
to stop and listen, in order to find out whether a train is -approaching, before
attempting to cross. Per GOaLD, J.
A request on the part of defendant for an instruction to the jury, "That if the
negligence of the deceased" (plaintiff) "in any way contributed to cause the
collision, which resulted in his death, plaintiff cannot recover," contains a legal
proposition, "the true legal rule of the case. and he was'entitled to have it given
to the jury, substantially as he asked it, without qualification, or to have it
plainly refused." Per GOULD, J.
The danger at the crossing of a railroad and street at grade is one for which
travellers are as much bound to watch, and to guard against, as the railway
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company, and the negligence of the companyiwill not excuse or qualify the duty
of watchfulness on the part of the traveller. Per GOULD, J.
A request on the part of defendant, to charge the jury, that if the deceased was
tware of the approach of the train, before he drove upon the track, and volunarily drove upon it, after being so aware of its approach, he cannot recover,
hould be answered in the affirmative. Per GOULD, J.

Tohn

. Beynolds, counsel for defendants, appellants.

William A. Beach, counsel for plaintiff, respondent.
GOULD, J.-This case comes before us on two appeals; one
from an order of the General Term of the Supreme Court, affirming an order of the special term which denied the defendant's
motion for a new trial, made on the minutes of the judge who
tried the cause; that appeal bringing the case up as if on a case
made. The other appeal is from the judgment of the Supreme
Court, affirming the judgment rendered at the circuit on a verdict;
this appeal bringing before us the exceptions taken by the defendants to different parts of the charge to the jury, and also the
exceptions taken to the denial of the defendants' two motions for
a nonsuit; one made at the close of the plaintiff's testimony, the
other made at the close of all the testimony.
The right to recover damages for this class of injuries to the
person (whether asserted by the party injured, or by his representatives under the statute), depends upon two concurring facts.1st. The party claimed to have done the injury must- be chargeable with some degree of negligence, if a natural person; if a
corporation, with some degree of negligence on the part of its
agents or servants. 2dly. The party injured must have been
entirely free from any degree of negligence which contributed to
the injury, i. e. of any negligence without which the injury would
not have happened.
These essential elements of such a cause of action ire as
absolutely distinct from and independent of each other, as are the
two opposing parties, and each and both must be by itself in the
case, upon the evidence or there can be no recovery. The
question presented to the court or the jury, is never one of com-
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parative negligence, as between the parties ; nor does very great
negligence on the part of a defendant, so operate to strike a
balance of negligence, as to give a judgment to a plaintiff whose
own negligence contributed, in any degree, to the injury.
It is true that some of the reported cases of this kind of action,
use in a very uncertain manner the terms gross negligence,
ordinary negligence, ordinary or common prudence, and similar
terms. But however applicable such terms may be to the cases
of bailment of property, and between the different well-known
classes of such bailors and bailees, it is difficult to see how they
have strictly and legally, any application to cases like the one
under consideration. No element of fraud (or quasi fraud) or
wilfulness, enters into the cause of action. See Wells vs. NYew
York antralRailroad Co., decided last term. The law says to
the defendant, if you have by simple negligence caused this injury,
so far as you are concerned the ground of action is complete. At
the same time it says to the plaintiff, although so far as the
defendant's acts are concerned the case is made out, you cannot
prevail if you have by your simple negligence helped to bring
about the injury. In the words of Judge SELDEN, in the unreported case of Bernhardt vs. Bens. and Sar. Railroad Co., 23
How. Jr. 166, "if it appears that the party injured was guilty of
any negligence which contributed to the injury, there can be no
recovery."
Another preliminary point (to be passed upon generally, before
we can decide as to its being applicable to this case), is the claim
that the question of negligence belongs peculiarly to the jury, and
that cases involving that question should never be' taken from
them to be decided by the court. To this position it should be
answered, that there is no case known to the law (even the question of frauds, in certain cases where the statute says it is to be
submitted to the jury), in which an appellate court has not and
does not on proper occasions exercise the power of setting aside
the verdict of a jury, not merely when 'it is entirely against
evidence, but when it is clearly against the weight of evidence;
and no court can be guilty -of the absurdity of holding, that, in
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such a case, it would not have been competent for the judge, who
tried the cause, either to nonsuit the plaintiff, or-direct a verdict
in his favor as the case might have required. No, legal principle
compels him to allow' a jury to render a merely idle verdict.
The full extent of this position has been held by this court,
Johnson vs. Hudson River Railroad Co., 20 N. Y. Rep. 73, in
saying that " to carry a.case to the jury, the evidence on the part
of the plaintiff must be such as, if believed, would authorize them
to find that the injury was occasioned solely by the negligence of
the defendant." Judge SELDEN, in the case above named of Bernhard vs. Rens. and Sar. Railroad Co., says - cases may no doubt
arise in which the proof of negligence would be so clear and
irresistible, that the court would be justified in assuming, without
submitting the question to the jury, that negligence was established." Can this be true, without holding that in every case
where a verdict would be set aside as against the clear weight of
evidence, the court should take the decision of the case from the
jury? Certainly it is not easy to conceive any other definite
position which would be consistent with the decisions. See also
18 N. Y. Rep. 422.
Nor is the applicability of the rule varied by saying that the
evidence may consist of circumstances, from which inferences are
to be drawn as to negligence, and that as different minds may
draw different inferences from the same circumstances, the jury
must always be the judges of negligence where the evidence is
circumstantial. No one ever supposed that the right of a tribunal
of review to reverse a verdict as against the weight of evidence,
was confined to the cases of direct positive testimony. The right
covers all cases, by whatever kind of legal evidence any of them
are sought to be proved, and it proceeds according to the weight
of the evidence whether circumstantial or not. If the circumstances
are such that from them can be drawn two opposing inferences,
either one equally consistent with the proof, it is no argument
against the rule: but the case is one where there is not a clear
preponderance of evidence either way, and the rule is simply inapplicable. Still, in precisely such a case, Cotton vs. IJood, 98 Eng.
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Com. Law Rep. 566, it has been explicitly held, that the court
should nonsuit, because negligence on the part of a defendant
(as care on the part of a plaintiff in another case cited post) must
be made to appear by the evidence. This case says " the judge
will not be justified in leaving the case to the jury, where the
plaintiff's evidence is equally consistent with the absence as with
the existence of negligence in the defendant." But there are
many cases in which care or the want of it, is unmistakeably
apparent on the face of the circumstances. To walk within six
inches of the curbstone of a sidewalk is not careless; but to walk
as near the edge of a precipice is the act of a madman. Let us
examine this upon both points,-the rule as to negligence, on the
part of the person injured; and that as to the duty (as well as the
right) of a court to pass upon the question and nonsuit ;-there are
three strong cases; one in 91 Eng. Com. Law Rep.; one in 29 Conn.
Rep., and one in 1 Allen (Mass.) Rep. 187. The Connecticut case
(at p. 208-9) says that the rule, that the party injured must have
acted with ordinary prudence, is a stern unbending rule, which
has been settled by a long series of adjudged cases, and must be
considered as a settled law. And the decision set aside a verdict,
as against the evidence as applied to this rule; and that was a case
where it was conceded that the defendant was negligent. The
case in 91 Eng. Com. Law Rep., 148-9, affirmed a nonsuit,
because (though there was some evidence that defendant's servant
was negligent), there was not evidence enough to take the case to
the jury. While the case in 1 Allen, 187-90, lays down as the
undoubted law (of Mass.), that the plaintiff must show , by affirmative proof that he was in the exercise of due car;," and for failure
of such proof the court should, as it did, nonsuit. Let us examine
this case upon the principles of all but the last case (not passing
upon that). What proof is there of want of care on the part of
the defendant? So far as the plaintiff's witnesses are concerned,
one man, a tin pedlar, who stood by his tin wagon some five rods
from the track, talking with a woman to whom he was trying to sell
his tinware, says he first heard the whistle a very short time before
Wilds was struck by the engine or almost at that instant, and
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that he heard the bell of the engine before the engine was in sight.
That Wilds drove on to the track as the train was coming, and was
nearly across it when he was hit. Thqt the train was coming fast
for that part of the track, where it does not generally go fast. He
is the plaintiff's only witness who saw the occurrence, and he says
he did not see a flagman there. The point of collision was at the
crossing of the railroad track and Fourth Street in the lower part
of the City of Troy, and the time noonday. Carroll (a passenger
on the train), called for plaintiff, says he can't tell how fast the
cars were then moving; they were running very rapidly he thinks.
Eddy testifies as to the measurement of distances only; chiefly as
to how far up the track a person could see from Fourth Street
below the track, and says a man sitting in a wagon twenty-five
feet south of the south track in the centre of Fourth Street, could
see the cars at a distance of six hundred and fifty feet. Gifford
testifies that from the point of collision to the point where the
train was stopped after the collision was about four hundred feet.
This is all the plaintiff's evidence on the subject. No proof was
offered to show any rate of speed; or whether "fast for that part
of the track, or (what the witness thought) -very rapidly," was
six miles an hour or any other rate; and no evidence was offered
to show within what distance a train could be stopped when going
at any specified rate of speed.
This evidence proves these facts, that the defendrnt complied
with the statute, by giving the warning of the bell, so than it was
heard by the plaintiff's only witness at a distance sufficient and in
time sufficient to give abundant notice to all persons to keep off the
track ; that at the time of such warning, and as the train was
approaching the crossing, Wilds was not (nor was any oeic-) upin
the track for the engineer to see him and check his train, and
that the engine ran against an object which was put upon the track
suddenly (on a trot), and when the engineer had no reison to
anticipate or try to avoid bitting it. It would seem difficult to
say that there was any proof of any negligence of the def'endant.
And negligence, like any other ground of action. is to be proved.
Add to this the defendant's evidence. Orr testifies that le heard
VOL. XI.-6

WILDS vs. HUDSON RIVER RAILROAD CO.

the whistle before the flagman went to his position, and of course
from the whole evidence this was the long-warning whistle (as a
signal of an approaching train), not the short sharp whistle for
stopping, which was but the instant before collision. Maria Banker
heard the whistle and bell before Wilds came up to the track.
These two witnesses had no connection with the Railroad Company.
Again, the flagman heard both whistle and bell before he went
from his flaghouse to the flagman's station upon the crossing.
Young, the conductor, testifies to the sounding of the long-warning
vhistle as far off as the bridge above the hospital. Gregory, the
engineer, says the whistle was sounded above the hospital, and the
bell was ringing all the time from the depot to the crossing in
question (half a mile). Porter, the fireman, says he rang the bell
all the way down, and the whistle was sounded above the hospital.
'Van Hoesen, the brakesman, says the whistle was sounded and the
bell rung through the cut (which terminates at the hospital).
Roarke, baggage-master, says the long whistle was blown long
before they got to the place of collision. Thus eigltt witnesses,
not in any way discredited (by cross-examination orotherwise),
two of whom had no bias for the defendant, establish affirmatively, that the company did give the proper warning of approach;
and as to that point it is beyond controversy, that there was no
negligence on the part of the defendant.
As to speed-Young thinks it about five miles an hour; Gregory
says it was about five or six miles an hour; Porter says about
six miles an hour, as estimated to the best of his knowledge;
Roarke says about six or seven miles an hour. It is proved that
the rails were slippery from a recent rain, which rendered stopping
quickly difficult. Bat there is no proof, as to the distance required
for stopping a train at any rate of speed. And even if the rate
of speed might have something to do witli the question of defendant's want of care, there is no shadow of proof that it did.
The only other point on which the plaintiff's case made even a
suggestion of negligence on the part of the defendant, is that the
one witness, Gillespie (the tin-pedlar), says "cthere was no flagman
there that he could see." On this point he is unquestionably in
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error. Porter, Orr, Maria Banker, O'Brien, Agan (the flagman),
Ware; six witnesses, four of whom were unconnected with the
company, testify not merely to the flagnman's being there, but to his
making abundant signals of an approaching train, and being nearly
run over-actually hit-by the team of Wilds. Due care in this
respect is abundantly, overwhelmingly proved. Nor is it at all
material to this point of due care, whethir the flagman being on
the-track and waving his flag as a signal, was devoting his particular attention to keeping back Wilds, or to keeping a woman and
child out of danger. He was there making .signals plainly visible
to all; and that he could not attend to two at once, when both
were bent on running into danger, was not his fault or that of the
company. The men upon the engine tried to stop, as soon as they
saw any reason for stopping. Seeing the flagman in his place to
keep persons off the track, and there being no one on the track,
they had no reason to suppose that any one would disregard all
the usual warnings and get on the track directly under the engine.
As soon as Wilds did this they saw him and attempted all possible
means to avoid the collision, but it was then inevitable.
The entire evidence fails utterly to show any degree of negligence on the part of the company; and the second motion for a
nonsuit should have been granted.
On the other hand, how stands the proof of carelessness on the
part of the deceased? The plaintiff's chief witness, the only one
who saw the occurrence, says: "cWhen I first heard the whistle he
was getting right on to the south railroad track with his horses.
If he had stopped then he would not have been hit; he could not
stop very easily." He did whip his horses, and went across this
south track and nearly across the north track, when on that track
his wagon was struck.
The defendants' witnesses show a very strong case of carelessness, if not of utter recklessness, on Wilds' part. Orr tesifies to
the flagman's being in the iddle of the street, between the two
tracks, waving his flag both ways, and that teams were checked by
that and waited. That O'Brien attempted to stop Wilds by throwing up his hands and shouting at him; and that failing to stop him
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by these means, O'Brien stepped into the street and tried to catch
the horses. Wilds drew up the reins, whipped up the horses, and
went across the track, when the engine struck him. That Wilds'
horses in crossing struck the flagman and turned him round two or
three paces. That when O'Brien shouted to him the horses were
fifteen feet from the south track ; and coming upon a smart trot.
Maria Banker says, that having heard the whistle and bell, she
looked out of her window (which commands a clear view of the spot),
and saw this man approaching on a fast trot. She hallooed to him
to stop, he looked around; she hallooed to him again; he whipped
his horses; the flagman held his flag before the horses, the flagman
was hit by the horses and went down. When she hallooed the
horses had not got on to the south track. O'Brien says the flagman was in his position swinging his flag; and that seeing Wilds
coming up on a trot, and knowing him, he started towards him to
keep him back, holding up his hands to him for that purpose; and
finally he tried to grasp the horses. The horses passed him, went
on the track, hit the flagman in the back, went on in front of the
engine, and the collision occurred. Agan the flagman says he was
in his proper place waving his flag; that his immediate attention
was taken by a woman with a child in her arms, whom he was
keeping off the track, when Wilds' team struck him, as he was
standing on the south track, and he barely escaped 'with his life.
Ware was further off: he saw the flagman there and says he was
trying to keep Wilds back, and that Wilds kept pushing up and
hit the flagman. He says the flagman was facing Wilds: an error
not very remarkable in the confusion, and not important, since he
confirms the facts that the flagman was there aild was struck by
the team. It is further in evidence that the railroad had been in
operation there some eighteen months ; and that Wilds was well
acquainted with the city; came to it every Saturday to supply his
customers with the produce of his farm (which was some twelve
miles out); and that, on this day, he had gone to South Troy,
across this very track, to a customer's house ; so that he knew the
railroad was there, and all about the crossing. Is it possible from
all this body of direct evidence to draw two inferences? Can
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there be a doubt that Wilds knew the train was coming, and prepared to take his chance of speed's insuring his safety? Or if
there can be any doubt of this, is it not inevitably certain, that all
the appliances of caution proved to have been used, must have
made him aware that there was something unusual at that point,
calling on him for at least sufficient attention to look about him
and find out what it was; so far, at any rate, as not to run over a
man who, for some purpose and with a signal flag, was standing in
the street and directly in his way? If his horses were at all
troublesome to manage (though there is no proof that they were
until they were actually on the south track, and near to the engine,
before which he had notice enough to pause), there were men
enough on the spot ready and able to assist him in holding them,
and one man tried to hold them back, not being called on. If
Wilds was careful, it would be difficult to imagine a case of 'want
af care.
The case is much stronger than that of Steves vs. The Oswego
and S. Railroad Co., 18 N. Y. Rep. 422-7, in which the Court
sustained a nonsuit, and that case remains the law of the state.
It is quite usual in similar suits to find counsel, and sometimes
judges, disposed to dwell upon the alarming power of a locomotive,
and the appalling danger of running one anywhere but in a wilderness; and great stress is laid on the strict and untiring watchfulness and care that are required of those who use so dangerous a
thing. All this is very true. But there are two sides to these
facts. If a locomotive be eminently dangerous, everybody knows
it to be so, and it is as dangerous to run against or under it, as to
have it run over you. A railroad crossing is known to be a
dangerous place, and the man, who knowing it to be a railroad
crossing, approaches it, is careless, unless he approaches it as if it
were dangerous. To him the danger is vastly greaterthan. it is to
the locomotive. He may lose his life. And if the company be
bound to use very great care not to endanger him, why is he not
bound to use equally great care not to be endangered? His care
should be as much graduated by the danger as the com avy's.
When every one who knows that the railroad is there is bound to
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know and to remember that a train may be approaching, not to
take the very simple precaution of looking and listening to find
out whether one is coming, cannot but be want of care. To be
sure, the statute requires a railroad company to give specified
warnings; but it neither takes away a man's senses, nor excuses
him from using them (18 N. Y. Rep. 425-6). The danger may
be there, the precaution is simple. To stop to pause is certainly
safe. His time to do so is before he puts himself in " the very
road of casualty." And if he fails to do so, it is of no consequence
in the eye of the law, whether he merely misjudges or is obstinately
reckless. His act is not careful, and he is to abide the consequences; and not the company under, or into, whose train he sees
fit to run, whether he did so in inexcusable ignorance, or in the
belief that he could run the gauntlet unharmed. Nor is the Court
to look about to find how he, after putting himself there, conducted ;
whether he then took the best means of escape, or in his confusion
ran more hopelessly into the jaws of death. No degree of presence
of mind, and no want of presence of mind, at that time, has anything to do with the case. He should not be there by want of care.
Much weight is given to the fact, that the place of such collision
is a highway; and that the traveller has a right to be there with
his vehicle. Certainly it is a highway or he would have no right
to be there at all, and he could not recover, no matter what might
be the negligence of the company. Further, it is a part of a railroad track, and the train has a right to be there. It is a place in
which two easements have a common right; and it is the right of
the public that both shall be so enjoyed as not unnecessarily to
interfere with or abridge the right of either.
A sound and reasonable view of cases of this description, is of
as much importance to the public as it is to railroad companies.
Such corporations are to be treated precisely as any other party
to a suit. No more stringent rule is to be applied to them than is
applied to individuals, nor is any less stringent one. Every citizen
of the state has a deep interest in the existence and successful
operations of such companies. The facilities of travel which they
afford; the means they give of accumulating and of diffusing the
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products of our wide land and of our vast commerce, have already
produced the mightiest results, in the development and the unparalleled increase of the resources of the nation. They have
clothed us with the richest garments of peace; and they have
multiplied our armies, and wielded our weapons of war. To do
this they have needed these powerful means, the use of which is
necessarily accompanied with danger. But as the public has the
benefit of those means, it is bound to incur its own share of that
danger. A nutual duty is enjoined and a mutual liability results
from a failure to perform that duty; and a party who fails in performing his own part thereof, is in no condition to enforce the
penalty of a breach .on the other party.
Having considered .the points embraced in the appeal from the
order denying a new trial on the merits, we come to the exceptions
contained in the appeal from the judgment.
The first exception to the charge of the judge is thus taken:
defendant requested the court to charge, ",that if the negligence
of the deceased in any way contributed to cause the collision
which resulted in his death, the plaintiff cannot recover." The
request was so far complied with as to give the charge in the terms
asked, qualifjing it with the words ",it being understood that this
negligence is the want of such care, as a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in like circumstances." The defendant
asked for his single, definite, legal proposition ; and excepted to
having it accompanied by any addition to give it uncertainty or
tending to confuse the minds of the jury. And if his request
contained a legal proposition, which unqualified, was sound and
applicable to the case, he had a right to have it announced to the
jury, if not in the very terms asked, at least substantially so, and
not so qualified as to alter the principle or to add to it, in any way
to render it uncertain, or tending to confuse the jury; or. he
should have it refused, either directly or on the ground that the
charge already given has properly covered the law of the case.
And while a juryman might suppose that he knew what, in the
circumstances proved, constituted -negligence," he might be
puzzled with so utterly indefinite a qualification; especially as in
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a prior part of the charge, the jury had been told to consider, in
estimating what would be negligent in Wilds' approach to the
crossing, "whether he understood the signals." Thus putting on
the company the obligation not merely of making the signals, but
of furnishing understanding to the other party.
The defendants' request certainly gave, in. precise words, the
true legal rule of the case ; and he was entitled to have it given
to the jury, substantially as he asked it, without qualification, or
to havre it plainly refused. The defendants' next request to charge
was, "that if the deceased approached the crossing, knowing the
position of the railroad, and that trains were frequently run thereon, at such a rate of speed that he was unable to stop his horses
before actually getting upon the track, and that speed contributed
to cause the collision, the plaintiff cannot recover." This, inasmuch as the charge had already as against the defendant included
the element of speed as constituting negligence, and had said ,the
speed should be regulated with reference to the apparent danger,"
this would seem an entirely proper request, that each party might
be held to looking out for the apparentdanger. It was refused,
except with the qualification that the defendant must have " used
all proper precautions to notify travellers of the approach of the
trains" (with other qualifications as to ordinary prudence). Which
is equivalent to saying that the wamt of care of Wilds depended
upon the exercise of care by the company, and that he might
approach a dangerous place with utter recklessness, unless the
company used all care; while the company must approach the
same place with ",all proper precaution," or be liable, not merely
for its own want of care, but for that of all comers. This is too
unequal to be sound. Each one's care or want of care exists in
his own act, without the slightest reference to care, or the want
of it, in the other party. Each is governed by his own independent volition, with which the other can by no possibility have any
connection; and on the exercise of that volition by each, and on
that only, depends the act which is either careful or not.
A further request to charge on the part of the defendant, contained the proposition, "that if the deceased was aware of the
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approach of the train in time to have stopped before reaching the
track upon which the train was approaching, and intentionally
drove upon the track after being aware of the train, the plaintiff
cannot recover." The court refused to charge in this form. The
request covers this ground: that if the deceased, knowing that'a
train was approaching, in season to take his own course, and decide
whether to be safe and stop, or to go on and run his chance, chose
to go on, he must abide the risk that he took. It is rather difficult
to see why this is not law. Certainly no legal rule is consistent
with qualifying the position, by leaving it with the jury to speculate on the idea whether he "would have stopped in the exercise
of reasonable care, &c., and could not reasonably expect to pass
in safety, and intentionally drove upon the track," &c. This
limits the negligence on his part to a grade little short of suicide.
Another of the defendants' requests to charge claimed that
,"the deceased cannot, by his own negligence, cast upon the defendants the necessity of exercising extraordinary care." The
court added after the word "negligence," cas above defined and
contributingto the injury." The request seems to state an accurately correct, legal proposition, and the defendant was entitled
to have it given to the jury as hereinbefore stated.
The judgment of the Supreme Court and its order should
be reversed, and a new trial granted. Costs to abide
event.
The rule, in regard to the kind of
negligence in a plaintiff which will preclude him from recovering damages for
the acknowledged negligence of the defendant, is here very carefully and perspicuously defined, and, in the main, as
t seems to us, very accurately. The
principle upon which this exclusion
goes, is not, in all the cases where the
question has occurred, very distinctly
presented. It rests upon the impossibility of determining accurately how
much of the injury is attributable to
the fault of the plaintiff, and, by consequence, how much to that of the de-

fendant; and the further consideration,
that the plaintiff has no right to ask a
jury to guess at the measure of damage
caused by the defendant's negligence,
when, but for his own fault, the decision would not have been embarrassed
.'
by any uncertainty of that kind.
There is also another difficulty in
cases of this kind, i. e. in determining
precisely whether the negligence of the
one party, or that of the other, by itself
alone, would have produced the injury.
In any case where that is clearly determinable, and it is certain the negligence
of the plaintiff, although contributing
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somewhat towards the production of the
injury, would, nevertheless, have been
inadequate to its production; and the
negligence of the defendant, therefore,
did produce the injury, and would have
produced it, altogether independent of
the negligence of the plaintiff, it seems
just and reasonable that the defendant
should be held responsible for the resuiting damage. And in almost every
cause in which we have participated in
the trial, where this question has arisen,
juries have adopted this view, in defiance of the ruling of the court, simply because to their unsophisticated
common sense, it appears just and
reasonable, and they cannot be made to
comprehend any other rule upon the
subject.
But the courts have not, as yet,
adopted any such sensible rule. It is
hinted at in the foregoing definition of
Mr. Justice GOULD ; but the whole defi-

nition excludes this plain and palpable
rule. But the courts seem to us verging
towards this point. For they have decided, repeatedly, that any negligence
which is not the proximate cause of the
injury, or which does not contribute
directly to produce the injury, will not
preclude the plaintiff's recovery : Keitt
vs. Pinkham, 43 Maine R. 501; Colegrove vs. N. Y. and Harlaem and N. Y.
and N. H. Railw., 6 Duer 382. And if
the defendant might have prevented the
injury, notwithstanding the negligence
of the plaintiff, lie is liable. Davis vs.
Munn, 1 M. & W. 564; Illidge vs. Goodwin, 5 C. & P. 190; Augusta and Savannah Railw. vs. MeElmurry, 24 Ga. R. 75.
But the majority of recent cases
have not yet said that any negligence
of the plaintiff directly contributing
towards the production of the injury,
but in itself inadequate to its production, will not preclude a recovery. The
conclusive argument against this view

hitherto, has been the difficulty or impossibility of always determining the
facts involved in the inquiry in that
form. But that is no greater than in
multitudes of other questions, which
arise almost daily, in the course of jury
trials. And the uncertainty of proof is
never held to affect the principles upon
which causes are to be submitted to
juries. The unsatisfactory character
of the rules of law applicable to questions almost always arising in trials of
this character has led to the most uncertain results in regard to them, and results the most unjust and unreasonable,
if we regard the rules and principles of
law now applied to the subject, as
entirely sound- We do not intend to
say that they are not so. But it. has
long seemed to us that they will require
revision, and essential modification,
before they can be made so far comprehensible, by plain juries, as to receive
anything approaching a fair and uniform application to cases as they arise.
And so long as jury trials continue in
civil causes, and we believe that will be
as long as our free government continues, it is certainly desirable to make
the rules of law so far conform to the
practical common sense instincts of
men, that juries will be able to understand them, and willing to apply them
fairly and fully.
Some of the moxe recent cases seem
to us to be approximating a more intelligible and practicable rule in regard
to the precise character and e.tent of
misconduct on the part of the plaintiff
which shall preclude a recovery by him.
In Waite vs. North-Eastern Railway
Company, 5Jur. N. S. 936 (1859), where
a child was injured through the joint
negligence of the servants of the company, and of those who had charge of
the child, it was held there could be no
recovery. This judgment was affirmed

WILDS vs. HUDSON RIVER RAILROAD CO.
in Exchequer Chamber; El. Bl. & El.
719; 28 L. J. Q. B. 258.
It has been repeatedly decided that it
is equally the duty of the plaintiff toexercise watchfulness to escape danger,
while going along the highway, that it
is for others rightfully in the use of the
highway, to avoid inflicting injuries
upon those in the highway. And from
necessity this watchfulness must be proportioned to the degree of peril known
to exist in passing along the highway.
Cotton vs. Wood, 8 C. B. N. S. 568; 7
Jur. N. S. 168. The injury must have
resulted from the misconduct of defendant or there can be no recovery. In the
language of EAR..,
Ch. J., in the last
case, "There must be evidence of welldefined negligence; that there was some
negligence is not sufficient to go to the
jury." In cases where the proof of negligence against defendant seems nearly
equally balanced, or where it is very
slight, it is the duty of the court to direct
a verdict for defendant, or to nonsuit
the plaintiff. Cornman vs. Eastern Counties Railway Company, 4 H. & N. 787.
The greatest advance towards a sound
and sensible rule upon this perplexing
subject, which we have yet seen, will be
found in Scott vs. Dublin and Wicklow
Com. Law. Rep.
Railway Company, 11 It.
377, where it is held, "Nor can he recover, notwithstanding there is negligence on the part of the defendant, if he
has so far contributed to the accident,
by the want of ordinary care, that but
for that the accident would not have
happened; but though a plaintiff has so
contributed to the accident, he is not
disentitled to recover, if the defendant
might by ordinary care have avoided
the consequences of the plaintiff's neglect."

And it would seem clear that where
but for the plaintiff's negligence, at the
time, he might have escaped the consequences of the defendant's negligence,
he cannot recover. Id.
In regard to the distinction where
cases of alleged negligence should be
submitted to the jury, or decided by the
court, see Briggs vs. Taylor, 28 Vt. Rep.
180, and cases cited.
If we understand Judge GouVn's opinion, the principal case was decided
upon the evidence, as showing, beyond
all question, that there was no negligence on the part of defendant, and that
the injury resulted solely from the foolhardy and reckless misconduct of the
plaintiff. The comments of the judge
in regard to the law, which are in the
main certainly very sound and just,
need not be here reviewed, since it
scarcely amounts to the determination
of the full Court of Appeals. If so we
should hesitate to subscribe to all that
is said in regard to the requests of the
defendant and the answers of the court
below. But with this qualification the
opinion is very satisfactory. And the
only qualification which we would desire
to make in the matter alluded to is, that
it seems to us, the discretion allowed
the judge at the trial, in regard to his
mode of responding to requests of counsel to charge the jury, is too much restricted. It gives the counsel the advantage over the judge, as it seems to
us, which is certainly not desirable,
since their clients might require them
to use it, in a manner not entirely consistent with proper freedom and independence of the court; -and, possibly,
sometimes, in a way to mislead the jury.
I. F. R.
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In the Court of Appeals of the State of New York.
CHARLES CLAFLIN et al. VS. THE FARMERS' AND CITIZENS' BANK OF
LONG ISLAND.1
1. An agent of a bank who, in general terms, is authorized by a by-law or otherwise to certify checks drawn upon the bank, cannot certify his own checks when
he has no funds to his credit, so as to make the bank liable. The rule of the law
of agency is applicable, that an agent cannot put himself in a position of hostility to his principal.
2. A holder who pays value for such a check cannot be said to take it in good
faith. The fact that the name of the drawer is identical with that of the certifying agent is sufficient to put him upon inquiry. Thu holder is bound to
ascertain whether the certifying officer is using his official position to perpetrate
a fraud. If such is the fact, he cannot recover from the bank.
8. Where a judge, at the circuit, on the ez parte application of a party to an
action, irregularly refers a cause to a referee to try the whole issue, and the
party who has a right to object proceeds with the trial of the action, produces
evidence, and submits the case to the referee without objection, the question
of the irregularity of the reference cannot be raised upon an appeal.

This action was brought to recover upon three checks drawn
upon the defendants' bank and- certified as good by their president.
Two of the checks, one for $5500 and one for $10,000, were
drawn by the president, G. W. Houghton, to the 'order of Oct.
Cleveland, and the other for $5000 by Thomas Green, payable to
the order of said Cleveland. The referee finds that the checks
were drawn and certified at their date. The president had authority to certify checks upon the defendants" bank, that such
checks were certified at his business office in New York, that such
fact was not known to the plaintiffs when they received the checks.
(The complaint states that the defendants' bank transacted business
at Williamsburgh, in the county of Kings.) The referee further
finds that the said checks at their date were delivered to the payee
thereof, who at the same time paid the drawers the full amount
thereof: that the payee of such checks indorsed and transferred
1 We owe this case to the kindness of Smith, J., for which he will accept our
thanks.-Ens.

CLAFLIN vs. FARMERS' AND CITIZENS' BANK.

the same to the plaintiffs on the day of their dates, who then paid
to the said payee the full amount of said cheeks respectively, and
that the plaintiffs so received said checks in good faith, and have
ever since held the same. That they were presented for payment
December 1st, 1854, at defendants' bank, and payment refused.
The checks are dated, the one signed by Green, December 31st,
1853; the $5500 by Houghton, February 4th, 1854; and the
$10,000 check, February 25th, 1854.
The defendant moved for a nonsuit, when plaintiffs rested.
Motion denied and defendants excepted. Farther evidence was
then given by defendants and plaintiffs.
As matter of law the referee found that the defendants were
liable upon such checks: That the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment for $26,229 thereon.
To which report and finding of law and fact the defendants duly
excepted.
The judgment of the referee was affirmed on appeal at the
General Term of the first district, and defendants appealed to this
Court.
By the Court:
E. DARWIN SMITH, J.-The objection that the cause was improperly referred on the ex parte application of the plaintiffs'
counsel at the circuit, cannot now be raised. If there was error
in the reference, the defendants should have applied to the circuit
judge or at special term to vacate the order. After giving testimony before the referee and trying the cause upon the merits
without objection, it is too late to raise the question in the court
of revision that the action was improperly referred.
The motion for a nonsuit was properly denied. When it was
made the plaintiffs had proved the making of the three checks,
and the acceptance by the indorsement thereon by the defefldants'
president of the word good, and also a by-law of the defendants'
which impliedly authorized the president to certify checks, and
also the due presentment of the checks thereafter and the refusal
of the defendants to pay the same.
This proof clearly at least entitles the plaintiffs to recover upon
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the $5000 check made by Thomas Green. The remaining questions relate to the two checks of Houghton, the defendants*
president, of $5500 and $10,000, made and accepted by him.
The power .given him by the by-law to certify checks clearly
did not authorize him to certify his own checks. It is a necessary
and universal implication, in all cases of agency, that the power
conferred .upon the agent is to be exercised for the exclusive
benefit. of the principal. It is repugnant to the very nature and
exercise of such power to hold that it may be used for the benefit
of the agent in hostility to the interests of the principal. That a
trustee or agent shall not act for his own benefit in any matter
relating to his agency or trust, is an old and familiar doctrine of
the courts of equity, frequently asserted in this country and in
England.
The rule is applicable to all persons standing in a trust relation.
The principal is entitled to the exercise in his behalf of all the
skill and industry and ability of his agent, to his utmost fidelity to
his business.
This rule is well stated and discussed in the opinion of Judge
DE.NIo in the case of The New York Central Insurance Company
vs. National Protection Insurance Company, 14 N. Y. 85, and
S. C. 20 Barb. 471.
But it is claimed that these rules do not apply in their strictness
to negotiable paper; that when there is an apparent authority to
execute such paper a bond fide holder is to be protected, as in the
case of partnership paper in the hands of an innocent holder.
These checks were negotiable, and the certificate thereon indorsed
by- the defendants' president was equivalent in legal effect, if a
valid act, to the acceptance of a bill of exchange to the same
amount. Judge SELDEN, in the case of The Farmers'and Mechanics'
Bank of Kent Co. vs. Butchers' and -Drovers'Bank, 16 N. Y. 128,
says of such checks: ,Each check, if duly certified, imposes upon
the bank an obligation to retain the amount for which the check
is drawn, and the obligation assumed is substantially the same as
that assumed by the acceptance of an ordinary bill of exchange."
Judge DENIO uses very nearly the same language in the same- case
in 14 N. Y. 625.
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These checks, after their acceptance in the manner above stated,
were transferred to the plaintiffs for their full face, as the referee
finds, and he also finds that he received the same in good faith for
value.
This consideration presents all the difficulty in the ease. A
bond fide holder of negotiable commercial paper is a favorite of
the law, and his rights are always guarded by the courts with
great care and liberality, from respect to the great interests of
trade and commerce.
But I do not think this consideration can be permitted to prevail,
to sustain the plaintiffs' right of recovery in this case upon these
two checks.
Clearly upon well settled principles Houghton had no power to
accept his own drafts or checks in behalf of the bank. The act
was a palpable excess of authority, and any person taking the
paper was bound to inquire as to the power of the agent. so to
contract.
This rule was asserted in the cases of Starin vs. The Town of
Genoa, and Gould vs. The Town of Sterling, 23 N. Y. 452 and 464.
In these cases the plaintiffs were the bondfide holders of the bonds
in suit, had paid their full value for them; but this court held,
that they were bound to inquire as to the facts upon which the
authority of the agent depended to issue the bonds. Judge SELDEN
says, page 464, -One who takes a negotiable note or bill of
exchange purporting to be made by an agent, is bound to inquire
as to the power of the agent."
Within that rule the plaintiffs were bound to inquire, whether
Houghton had authority to accept his own checks in behalf of the
bank, so as to bind the bank on the acceptances. But r do not
think the plaintiffs can properly be called bond fide holders of these
checks. The referee finds that they are holders for value, and that
they paid the full amount of the face of the checks and took them in
good faith. This is all the rpferee finds on the facts. In finding
as a conclusion of law that the defendants are liable on such checks,
he may perhaps be deemed to find that they were bond fide holders
thereof within the legal sense of such purchase.
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But I think the conclusion of law erroneous, and that the plaintiffs cannot be truly considered in a commercial or legal sense
bond fide holders of these checks. A bond fide holder of commercial paper must receive the same in the usual course of business
for value, and without any notice of facts tending to impeach the
character and validity of the paper as between the original parties.
The plaintiffs cannot claim the protection of this rule. They
had distinct notice by the form of the certificate and the signature
thereto, that the acceptance was improper and irregularly made.
It was patent on the face of the paper that the acceptance was a
fraud. That the president of the defendants' bank in accepting
such checks, was using his official character for his- personal benefit,
and thereby perpetrating an act of dishonesty in palpable violation
of his trust. No business man of common int.elligence could take
these checks in good faith and without suspicion or notice of this
fraud. Upon this distinct question I would hold, that the plaintiffs are not bond fide holders of these checks, and are not entitled
to recover the same of the defendants; and the fact also, that these
three checks of $20,500, were taken and held for the period of
nearly a year after their receipt by the plaintiffs, without presentation to the bank for payment, and that this large amount of money
was thus left in the bank to the credit of the drawer of the checks,
without interest or any arrangement about it,-unexplained, is
quite conclusive evidence that the checks were not taken in the
usual course of business. But evidence may be given on another
trial explanatory of this delay in presenting the checks for payment, which may be quite satisfactory. Evidence on this point
was offered, which I think was erroneously excluded by the referee.
That this defence, though in its origin and nature of an equitable
kind, is now available in an action at law upon the instrument
improperly executed by the agent or trustee, is fully asserted and
distinctly held in the opinion of Judge DENMO, in the case of The
Yew York Mutual Insurance Co. vs. The Mutual ProtectionInsurance Co., 14 N. Y. 90, supra, and is, therefore, res adjudicata in
this court.
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I think the judgment of the court below should be reversed, and
a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
Judgment reversed.
SELDEN, DENIo, GOULD,

and

ALLEN,

I. The first case in which thea English
Courts found it necessary to pass upon
the usage then prevailing with bankers
to mark checks as "good," appears to
have been Robson and Waugh vs. Bennett, 2 Taunton 389 (1810). The head
note of that case is as follows :--" By the
practice of the London bankers, if one
banker who holds a check drawn on
another banker presents it after four
o'clock, it is not then paid, but a mark
is put on it to show that the drawer has
assets, and that it will be paid; and
checks so marked have a.priority, and
are exchanged or paid next'day at noon
at the clearing-house; *
Held, that
such a marking under this practice
amountS to an acceptance, payable next
day at the clearing-house." The Court
said, (MANSIE.D, C.

.): "The effect of

that marking is similar to the accepting
of a bill; for he .(the. banker) admits
hereby assets, and makes himself liable
to pay."- In that case the check was
marked at the banking-house by one of
the partners in the banking firm. Most
of the cases which have arisen in this
country have concerned the power of
agents of corporations to certify checks
in like manner. We think where the
power is impliedly conferred upon an
agent to certify checks, that it can only
be exercised at the place of business of
the bank. As soon as the check is certified it is in the course of business
charged to the account of the drawer as
so much money paid to his order, and
the check is entered in a new account
of certified checks. Such is the practice
with the banks in the city of New York,
VoL. IL-7

Js., concurred.

and must in the nature of the case be
substantially the same everywhere. This
practice evidently could not be adhered
to if the certifying officer was allowed
to attend to his duties while absent from
the bank. This view seems to have received the sanction of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Iassachusetts: Bullard vs. Randall, 1 Gray 607 (1854).
SHA.w, C. J., says: "Were it the practice
of banks to accept checks and thereby
bind the bank to their payment, it would
benecessary to keep a separate account
with the depositor in which all such
acceptances should be charged; such
acceptance being as effectual a reduction
of the deposit as actual payment, making the bank from the time of such
acceptance a debtor to the holder, and
discharging them as debtor to the
drawer: otherwise a bank would never
know, on the presentation of a check,.
whether the drawer had funds to pay it
or not. But if it must be presented,
accepted, and charged before it can
avail the holder, this must necessarily
be done at the bank, and the verbal
assent of the cashier elsewhere could
not avail the holder." In the principal
case, it was unnecessary to pass upon
this point, as the acceptance was invalid
on other grounds. But whenever that
question is fairly presented, it. is believed thatthe conclusion will be reached
that nothing short of a distinct course
of business or express authority will
confer upon the certifying agent the
power to certify checks, while absent
from the bank, in favor of a holder who
knew that the check was thus certified.
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II. It is now well settled, whenever
the certifying officer has acted in the
ordinary course of business, and the
certified cheek has passed into the hands
of a bondfide holder for value, the bank
cannot show in defence that the drawer
had no funds when the check was certified. The reason of this rule is well
explained by SELDEN, J., in the case of
Gould vs. The Town of Sterling, 23 N.
Y. 439. See note 1 Am. Law Register,
N. S. 291; Farmers' and Mechanics'
Bank vs. Butchers' and Drovers' Bank,
16 N. Y. 125. The system of certifying,
checks does not appear to be practised
in England. Lord WENSLEYnALE (PARKE,
B.) says, in Bellamy vs. Marjoribanks,
7 Exch. 404 (1852), that it is a practice
"not usual but legal."
II. Some attempt has been made In
recent authorities to show that the holder
of a check could, without any certificate
or acceptance, sue the bank if it refused
to pay the check when it had funds of
the drawer sufficient to meet it. The
only case in which that point is known
to have been decided is Fogarties vs. State
Bank, in the Court of Appeals of South
Carolina in 1860, 8 Am. Law Register
393. The Court says, with commendable
candor, "We do not hear of a right of
action on the part of the holder." The
reasoning is as novel and unprecedented
as the decision. It would be scarcely
necessary to notice this case, had it not
received the sanction of Mr. Parsons in
his recent edition (1862) of "The Elements of Mercantile Law." He says:
"But whether the holder of a check in
case of refusal may sue the bank for
non-payment, is a question of some difficulty, and is not yet settled by authority.
But we have no doubt but that, on correct principles of commercial law, the
holder should have this right, so long as
the bank has funds of the depositor in
its possession." P. 91, citing the case

already noticed. It is difficult, however,
to see what principle of the law'of comamercial paper could be invoked to sustain such an action. Nothing can be
more elementary than that a drawee of
any ordinary draft or bill of exchange
must accept it before the holder can
have a right of action against him. If
there is any different rule in the case of
checks, it must be for special reasons.
not applicable to other commercial instruments. We have seen nothing bearing the semblance of an argument in
favor of the proposition but this. It
has now become a.settled rule of law
with a number of the American Courts,
that if A., for a valid consideration,
promises B. that he will pay C. a sun,
of money, C. can maintain an action
against A., though a stranger to the
consideration. Carnegie vs. Morrison, 2
Metcalf 381; Barker vs. Bucklin, 2
Denio 45. It is urged that this doctrine
can be applied in favor' of the holder
of a check. The reasoning is, that the
bank agrees with the depositor to pay
any person whom he may designate by
drawing the check in his favor. *The
reply is that there is no analogy between the cases. In thle first class of
cases, there is an express contract entered
into with a person designated at the time
the contract is made, or an express direction given by the party advancing the
consideration, to which the person
claimed to be liable hag assented. In
the case of the check, the contract of the
bank with the drawer is implied by law,
and no third person is named by the
parties. The oases would be precisely
parallel if the bank agreed to pay checks
drawn in favor of a particular person,
which would be tantamount to an acceptance. On the theory of the South Carolina Court, when is the contract with the
holder made? When the check is drawn
and delivered to the holder ? If so, a

